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IN THE MATTER OF MARK FELKER DAHLE, PETITIONER 
 
 
Petitioner was definitely suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, 
In the Matter of Dahle, 393 S.C. 576, 713 S.E.2d 617 (2011).  Petitioner has 
now filed a petition seeking to be reinstated. 
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hereby given that members of the bar and the public may file a notice of their 
opposition to or concurrence with the petition.  Comments should be mailed 
to: 
 
    Committee   on   Character   and   Fitness 
    P.   O.   Box   11330 
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1 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
OPINIONS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

AND 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF
	
SOUTH CAROLINA 

ADVANCE SHEET NO. 36 

September 7, 2016 

Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk 

Columbia, South Carolina 

www.sccourts.org 

2 

 
3 

 CONTENTS    THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA        PUBLISHED OPINIONS AND ORDERS  27664 - The State v. Theodore Manning  12  Order - In the Matter of Jarrett Skipper Calder 22  Order - RE: Expansion of Electronic Filing Pilot Program 23   
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
None 
 
PETITIONS - UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  25298 - The State v. Sammie Louis  Pending  27601 - Richard Stogsdill v. SCDHHS  Pending   EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION - UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  26770 - The State v. Charles Christopher Williams  Granted until 9/9/2016 
 
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING  27345 - Gregory Smith v. D.R. Horton  Pending  
    
The South Carolina Court of Appeals 
 
 
PUBLISHED OPINIONS 
 
5439-Meenaxi, Inc. v. S.C. Department of Revenue    25   
 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
 
None 
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 
 
5407-One Belle Hall v. Trammell Crow (TAMKO) Pending 
 
5414-In the Matter of the Estate of Marion M. Kay Pending 
 
5415-Timothy McMahan v. S.C. Department of Education Pending 
 
5416-Allen Patterson v. Herb Witter Pending 
 
5417-Meredith Huffman v. Sunshine Recycling Pending 
 
5418-Gary G. Harris v. Tietex International, Ltd. Pending 
 
5419-Arkay, LLC, v. City of Charleston Pending 
 
5421-Coastal Federal Credit v. Angel Latoria Brown Pending 
 
5424-Janette Buchanan v. S.C. Property and Casualty Ins. Pending 
 
5425-Carolyn Taylor-Cracraft v. Gerald Cracraft Pending 
 
5430-Wilfred Allen Woods v. Etta Catherine Woods Pending 
 
5431-Lori Stoney v. Richard Stoney Pending 
 
5432-Daniel Dorn v. Paul Cohen Pending 
 
5433-The Winthrop University Trustees v. Pickens Roofing Pending 
 
5434-The Callawassie Island Members Club v. Ronnie Dennis Pending 
 
4 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5435-State v. Joshua William Porch Pending 
5436-Lynne Vicary v. Town of Awendaw Pending 
2016-UP-184-D&C Builders v. Richard Buckley Pending 
2016-UP-275-City of North Charleston v. John Barra Pending 
2016-UP-280-Juan Ramirez v. Progressive Northern Pending 
2016-UP-281-James A. Sellers v. SCDC Pending 
2016-UP-316-Helen Marie Douglas v. State Pending 
2016-UP-325-NBSC v. Thaddeus F. Segars Pending 
2016-UP-340-State v. James R. Bartee, Jr. Pending 
2016-UP-348-Basil Akbar v. SCDC Pending 
2016-UP-366-In re Estate of Valerie D'Agostino Pending 
2016-UP-367-State v. Christopher D. Campbell Pending 
2016-UP-368-Overland v. Lara Nance Pending 
2016-UP-373-State v. Francis Larmand Pending 
2016-UP-377-State v. Jennifer Lynn Alexander Pending 
2016-UP-382-Darrell L. Goss v. State Pending 
2016-UP-394-State v. Shawn Patrick White Pending 
2016-UP-395-Darrell Efird v. State Pending 
2016-UP-397-Carlton Cantrell v. Aiken County Pending 
2016-UP-402-Coves Darden v. Francisco Ibanez Pending 
2016-UP-404-George S. Glassmeyer v. City of Columbia (2) Pending
5 

 PETITIONS-SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT 

 
5253-Sierra   Club   v.   Chem-Nuclear     Pending   
 
5254-State   v.   Leslie   Parvin       Pending   
 
5301-State   v.   Andrew   T.   Looper      Pending   
 
5326-Denise   Wright   v.   PRG      Pending   
 
5328-Matthew McAlhaney v. Richard McElveen   Pending 
 
5329-State   v.   Stephen   Douglas   Berry     Pending   
 
5333-Yancey   Roof   v.   Kenneth   A.   Steele     Pending   
 
5338-Bobby   Lee   Tucker   v.   John   Doe     Pending   
 
5342-John   Goodwin   v.   Landquest      Pending   
 
5344-Stoneledge v. IMK Development (Southern Concrete)  Pending 
 
5345-Jacklyn Donevant v. Town of Surfside Beach   Pending 
 
5346-State   v.   Lamont   A.   Samuel      Pending   
 
5348-Gretchen   A.   Rogers   v.   Kenneth   E.   Lee    Pending   
 
5355-State   v.   Lamar   Sequan   Brown     Pending   
 
5359-Bobby   Joe   Reeves   v.   State      Pending   
 
5360-Claude   McAlhany   v.   Kenneth   A.   Carter    Pending   
 
5365-Thomas Lyons v. Fidelity National     Pending   
 
5366-David   Gooldy   v.   The   Storage   Center    Pending   
 
5368-SCDOT   v.   David   Powell      Pending   
 
5369-Boisha   Wofford   v.   City   of   Spartanburg    Pending   
 
6 

  
5371-Betty   Fisher   v.   Bessie   Huckabee     Pending   
 
5373-Robert S. Jones v. Builders Investment Group   Pending 
 
5374-David M. Repko v. County of Georgetown   Pending 
 
5375-Mark   Kelley   v.   David   Wren      Pending   
 
5378-Stephen   Smalls   v.   State      Pending   
 
5382-State   v.   Marc   A.   Palmer      Pending   
 
5384-Mae Ruth Thompson v. Pruitt Corporation   Pending 
 
5387-Richard Wilson v. Laura B. Willis     Pending   
 
5388-Vivian   Atkins   v.   James   R.   Wilson,   Jr.    Pending   
 
5389-Fred   Gatewood   v.   SCDC   (2)     Pending   
 
5390-State   v.   Tyrone   King      Pending   
 
5392-State   v.   Johnie   Allen  Devore,   Jr.    Pending   
 
5395-State   v.   Gerald   Barrett,   Jr.      Pending   
 
5399-State   v.   Anthony   Bailey      Pending   
 
5402-Palmetto Mortuary Transport v. Knight Systems   Pending 
                                                                                          
2015-UP-010-Latonya Footman v. Johnson Food Services  Pending 
 
2015-UP-091-U.S.   Bank   v.   Kelley   Burr     Pending   
 
2015-UP-215-Ex Parte Tara Dawn Shurling (In re: State v. Harley) Pending 
 
2015-UP-262-State   v.   Erick   Arroyo     Pending   
 
2015-UP-266-State   v.   Gary   Eugene   Lott     Pending   
 
2015-UP-303-Charleston County Assessor v. LMP Properties  Pending 
7 

 2015-UP-304-Robert K. Marshall, Jr. v. City of Rock Hill  Pending 
 
2015-UP-311-State   v.   Marty   Baggett     Pending  
 
2015-UP-330-Bigford Enterprises v. D. C. Development  Pending 
 
2015-UP-350-Ebony   Bethea   v.   Derrick   Jones    Pending  
 
2015-UP-357-Linda   Rodarte   v.   USC     Pending  
 
2015-UP-361-JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Leah Sample   Pending 
 
2015-UP-364-Andrew   Ballard   v.   Tim   Roberson    Pending  
 
2015-UP-365-State   v.   Ahmad   Jamal  Wilkins    Pending  
 
2015-UP-376-Ron Orlosky v. Law Office of Jay Mullinax  Pending 
 
2015-UP-377-Long Grove at Seaside v. Long Grove Property  Pending 
Owners ( James, Harwick & Partners) 
 
2015-UP-378-State   v.   James   Allen  Johnson    Pending  
 
2015-UP-382-State   v.   Nathaniel   B.   Beeks    Pending  
 
2015-UP-388-Joann Wright v. William Enos    Pending  
 
2015-UP-391-Cambridge Lakes v. Johnson Koola   Pending 
 
2015-UP-395-Brandon Hodge v. Sumter County   Pending 
 
2015-UP-402-Fritz Timmons v. Browns AS RV and Campers  Pending 
 
2015-UP-403-Angela   Parsons   v.   Jane   Smith    Pending  
 
2015-UP-414-Christopher A. Wellborn v. City of Rock Hill  Pending 
 
2015-UP-423-North Pleasant, LLC v. SC Coastal Conservation Pending 
 
2015-UP-432-Barbara Gaines v. Joyce Ann Campbell   Pending 
 
2015-UP-455-State   v.   Michael   L.   Cardwell    Pending   
8 

  
2015-UP-466-State v. Harold Cartwright, III    Pending   
 
2015-UP-477-State v. William D. Bolt     Pending   
 
2015-UP-478-State   v.   Michael   Camp     Pending   
 
2015-UP-485-State   v.   Alfonzo   Alexander    Pending   
 
2015-UP-491-Jacquelin S. Bennett v. T. Heyward Carter, Jr.  Pending 
 
2015-UP-501-State   v.   Don-Survi   Chisolm    Pending   
 
2015-UP-505-Charles Carter v. S.C. Dep't of Corr. (3)   Pending 
 
2015-UP-513-State   v.   Wayne   A.   Scott,  Jr.    Pending   
 
2015-UP-524-State   v.   Gary   R.   Thompson    Pending   
 
2015-UP-540-State   v.   Michael   McCraw     Pending   
 
2015-UP-547-Evalena Catoe v. The City of Columbia   Pending 
 
2015-UP-556-State   v.   Nathaniel   Witherspoon    Pending   
 
2015-UP-557-State   v.   Andrew   A.   Clemmons    Pending   
 
2015-UP-564-State   v.   Tonya   Mcalhaney     Pending   
 
2015-UP-568-State   v.   Damian   D.   Anderson    Pending   
 
2015-UP-574-State   v.   Brett   D.   Parker     Pending   
 
2016-UP-010-State   v.   James   Clyde   Dill,   Jr.    Pending   
 
2016-UP-013-Ex parte State of South Carolina   In re: Cathy  Pending 
         J. Swicegood v. Polly A. Thompson 
 
2016-UP-015-Onrae Williams v. State     Pending   
 
2016-UP-021-State v. Darius Ranson-Williams    Pending   
 
9 

 2016-UP-023-Frankie Lee Bryant, III, v. State    Pending   
 
2016-UP-039-State   v.   Fritz   Allen  Timmons    Pending   
 
2016-UP-040-State v. Jonathan Xavier Miller    Pending   
 
2016-UP-052-Randall   Green   v.   Wayne   Bauerle    Pending   
 
2016-UP-054-Ex Parte: S.C. Coastal Conservation League   Pending 
v. Duke Energy 
 
2016-UP-055-State   v.   Ryan   P.   Deleston     Pending   
 
2016-UP-056-Gwendolyn Sellers v. Cleveland Sellers, Jr.  Pending 
 
2016-UP-061-Charleston   Harbor   v.   Paul   Davis    Pending   
 
2016-UP-067-National Security Fire v. Rosemary Jenrette  Pending 
 
2016-UP-068-State   v.   Marcus   Bailey     Pending   
 
2016-UP-069-John   Frick   v.   Keith  Fulmer    Pending   
 
2016-UP-070-State v. Deangelo Mitchell (AA Ace Bail)  Pending 
 
2016-UP-073-State   v.   Mandy   L.   Smith     Pending   
 
2016-UP-074-State   v.   Sammy   Lee   Scarborough    Pending   
 
2016-UP-089-William Breland v. SCDOT    Pending   
 
2016-UP-091-Kyle Pertuis v. Front Roe Restaurants, Inc.  Pending 
 
2016-UP-097-State   v.   Ricky   E.   Passmore    Pending   
 
2016-UP-109-Brook   Waddle   v.   SCDHHS    Pending   
 
2016-UP-118-State   v.   Lywone   S.   Capers     Pending   
 
2016-UP-119-State v. Bilal Sincere Haynesworth   Pending 
 
2016-UP-127-James Neff v. Lear's Welding    Pending   
10 

  
2016-UP-132-Willis Weary v. State     Pending   
 
2016-UP-137-Glenda R. Couram v. Christopher Hooker  Pending 
 
2016-UP-138-McGuinn Construction v. Saul Espino   Pending 
 
2016-UP-141-Plantation Federal v. J. Charles Gray   Pending 
 
2016-UP-151-Randy Horton v. Jasper County School   Pending 
 
2016-UP-153-Andreas Ganotakis v. City of Columbia Board  Pending 
 
2016-UP-160-Mariam R. Noorai v. School Dist. of  Pickens Cty. Pending 
 
2016-UP-162-State   v.   Shawn   L.   Wyatt     Pending   
 
2016-UP-168-Nationwide Mutual v. Eagle Windows   Pending 
 
2016-UP-171-Nakia   Jones  v.   State     Pending   
 
2016-UP-174-Jerome   Curtis   Buckson   v.   State    Pending   
 
2016-UP-187-Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Rhonda L. Meisner Pending 
 
2016-UP-189-Jennifer Middleton v. Orangeburg Consolidated Pending 
 
2016-UP-193-State v. Jeffrey Davis     Pending   
 
2016-UP-198-In the matter of Kenneth Campbell   Pending 
 
2016-UP-199-Ryan   Powell   v.   Amy   Boheler    Pending   
 
2016-UP-220-SCDSS   v.   Allyssa   Boulware    Pending   
11 

  
  
  
Appeal From Richland County 
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 
 Opinion No. 27664 

Heard November 4, 2015 – Filed September 7, 2016 

 REVERSED 
  
 
  
 
 THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

 
The State, Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
Theodore Manning, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000204 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of 
Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Luke Adcock Shealey, of The Shealey Law Firm, LLC, 
and Elizabeth Fielding Pringle, both of Columbia, for 
Respondent. 
ACTING JUSTICE TOAL: We granted the State's petition for writ of 
certiorari to consider the court of appeals' decision, State v. Manning, Op. No. 
2014-UP-411 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 19, 2014), holding the trial court erred in 
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the immunity 
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provision of the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act)1 applied and 
remanding the case to the trial court to conduct a full hearing. We reverse. 
1 Relevant to this appeal, the Act provides: 
 
(A) A person is presumed to have a reasonable fear of imminent peril 

of death or great bodily injury to himself or another person when 

using deadly force that is intended or likely to cause death or great 

bodily injury to another person if the person: 
	
 
(1) against whom the deadly force is used is in the process of 

unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and forcibly 

entered a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if he removes or 

is attempting to remove another person against his will from the 

dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and 

 
(2) who uses deadly force knows or has reason to believe that an 

unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act is occurring 

or has occurred. 

 
(B) The presumption provided in subsection (A) does not apply if the 

person: 

 
(1) against whom the deadly force is used has the right to be in or is a 

lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle 
	
including, but not limited to, an owner, lessee, or titleholder . . . . 

. . . 

 
(C) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is 

attacked in another place where he has a right to be . . . has no duty to 

retreat and has the right to stand his ground and meet force with force, 

including deadly force, if he reasonably believes it is necessary to 

prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or another person or to 

prevent the commission of a violent crime . . . . 

 
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440 (2015). 
13 

  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
FACTS/ PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Theodore Manning (Respondent) was charged with murder following the 
death of his girlfriend, Mikki McPhatter (the victim).  The victim died after being 
shot in the back of the head in Respondent's home.  It is undisputed that the victim
was unarmed.  Another of Respondent's girlfriends, Kendra Goodman, led police 
to the victim's abandoned and burned vehicle, where her charred skeletal remains 
were discovered in the trunk. 
Respondent sought immunity from prosecution under Act and in the 
alternative claimed he shot the victim in self-defense.  At a pre-trial hearing, 
Respondent's counsel relied upon Respondent's statement to police, introduced as 
an exhibit by the State, to support his immunity claim.  In the statement, 
Respondent maintained he had taken a gun away from the victim during an 
argument, but ultimately "pulled the trigger to show her to stop playing":   
It was a disagreement between the two of us. I was disregarding some 
of her questions when it came to the relationship . . . which turned into 
an argument that got heated.  [The victim] picked up the firearm, 
pointed it at me. I asked her what the hell was she thinking. She asked 
me was I still serious, referring to whether or not I wanted to have 
kids with her. I told her that it was just friends with benefits, which 
made her even madder. I told her to stop playing and took the gun 
from her. I grabbed her hands and just took it from her. Then I pointed 
it at her and asked her "Are you fucking crazy[.]" I told her that "You 
can't be mad at me because when I came up to see you last you were 
asking me if I wanted to be friends with benefits." She was still 
talking about whether I was serious. The whole time she was crying . . 
. even when she was pointing the gun at me she was crying. She hit 
the gun and I asked her again "Are you fucking crazy[?]" She told me 
"You're just like everybody else. You said that you were going to be 
there for me and you hurt me just like everybody else." She went to 
take a step like motioned toward me, but she pivot [sic] when she did 
it and I pulled the trigger to show her to stop playing. I didn't see 
where the bullet went. 
14 

  
 
Based on this statement, and considering it as an undisputed recitation of the 
facts, the trial judge heard arguments on the immunity motion from both sides.  
Respondent's counsel argued the statement constituted a "prima facie" showing, 
rebuttable by the State, that Respondent was entitled to immunity under the Act 
because the incident occurred in Respondent's home and the victim "pulled a gun 
on [Respondent]," Respondent "then disarmed her, and she came at him and he 
pulled the trigger." The State argued that because Respondent's statement 
indicated that the victim was unarmed when he shot her, Respondent was not in 
fear of great bodily injury or death at that time.  Further, the State argued that the 
victim was a guest in Respondent's home, and therefore, she did not unlawfully or 
forcibly enter the residence, which is required to invoke the Act's presumption of 
reasonable fear of imminent peril.  
 
After considering Respondent's statement to police and hearing arguments 
from counsel for both sides, the trial court denied Respondent's pretrial motion for 
immunity.  The matter then proceeded to a jury trial.  Respondent was convicted of 
voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years in prison.   
 
Respondent appealed, and the court of appeals found, inter alia, that the trial 
court was required to grant Respondent a full evidentiary hearing prior to 
determining whether the immunity provision applied, and therefore the court of 
appeals remanded the case for a full hearing.  See State v. Manning, Op. No. 2014-
UP-411 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 19, 2014).  We granted the State's petition for a 
writ of certiorari to decide whether this was in error. 
 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
 
The State argues that the court of appeals erred in finding the trial court is 
required to conduct a complete testimonial evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on 
whether the immunity provision of the Act applies.  We agree. 
  
 In   State v. Duncan, this Court interpreted the plain language of section 16-
11-450(A) of the South Carolina Code2 to require that the immunity determination 
                                        
2  See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-450(A) (providing "[a] person who uses deadly force 
as permitted by the provisions of this article or another applicable provision of law 
15 

  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                             
 
 
be made pre-trial.  404, 410, 709 S.E.2d 662, 665 (2011).  More specifically, the 
Court stated: 
[By] using the words "immune from criminal prosecution," the 
legislature intended to create a true immunity, and not simply an 
affirmative defense. We also look to the language of the statute that 
provides, "the General Assembly finds that it is proper for law-abiding 
citizens to protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders 
and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in 
defense of themselves and others." We agree with the circuit court 
that the legislature intended defendants be shielded from trial if they 
use deadly force as outlined under the Act. Immunity under the Act is 
therefore a bar to prosecution and, upon motion of either party, must 
be decided prior to trial. Accordingly, we find the trial court properly 
made a pre-trial determination of respondent's immunity.
Id.  The Court further explained that the appropriate standard of review in pre-trial 
determination would be a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 411, 709 S.E.2d 
662, 665. 
Neither the Act, nor Duncan, sets forth a specific type of hearing or 
procedure to be followed when a criminal defendant claims immunity under the 
Act. See State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 375 n.3, 752 S.E.2d 263, 268 n.3 (2013) 
(noting "the Act is silent on the procedure to follow when an accused seeks 
immunity and "Duncan interprets the Act to require a pretrial determination by the 
trial court"). Rather, all that is required under the Act and Duncan is that the court 
makes the immunity determination prior to trial.  
Respondent urges this Court to add the gloss of a full evidentiary hearing to 
the statutory language. In considering his request, we find instructive State v. 
Wessinger, 408 S.C. 416, 759 S.E.2d 405 (2014), which interpreted section 44-48-
is justified in using deadly force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil 
action for the use of deadly force, unless the person against whom deadly force 
was used is a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his official 
duties and he identifies himself in accordance with applicable law or the person 
using deadly force knows or reasonably should have known that the person is a law 
enforcement officer.").
16 

   
  
 
 
                                        
  
 
 
 
 
 
30(2) of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act).3  Subsection o of that 
section permits the trial judge to make a determination of whether the crime for 
which a person is charged qualifies as sexually violent even when it is not 
specifically enumerated under the SVP Act.4  In Wessinger, this Court considered 
whether a criminal defendant is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing prior to the 
judge making this determination, and held "that the scope and necessity of a 
separate evidentiary hearing is to be determined on a case-by-case basis."  408 S.C. 
at 420, 759 S.E.2d at 407. Moreover, the Court found "no error in the procedure 
utilized here where the circuit court's decision was based on the uncontested facts 
in the record, all of which were specifically acknowledged by appellant under 
oath." Id. at 421, 759 S.E.2d at 407. We agree with the State that this flexible 
approach is likewise desirable in immunity determinations under the Act.  Not only 
does this approach permit the trial judge to tailor the hearing to the needs of each 
case, but it serves to save precious judicial resources in cases like this one where 
an extensive hearing is simply unnecessary.5 
We review immunity determinations under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Curry, 406 S.C. at 370, 752 S.E.2d at 266; see also State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 
316, 768 S.E.2d 232, 237 (Ct. App. 2014) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when 
the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual 
conclusions, is without evidentiary support." (quoting State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 
527, 570, 647 S.E.2d 144, 166–67 (2007))).  Here, the undisputed facts support a 
3 See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-30(2) (Supp. 2013).
4 See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-30(2)(o).
5 To this end, we find unpersuasive Respondent's argument that because Duncan
imposes a preponderance of the evidence standard on the trial court, the immunity 
determination is distinguishable from determinations made under the SVP Act.  As 
the evidentiary hearing standard is a flexible one, there may be times that a trial 
court requires more evidence, be it testimonial or otherwise, to make the immunity 
determination.  This is not that case.  Here, Respondent's counsel asserted that the 
evidence submitted to the trial court, in the form of Respondent's statement, set 
forth a prima facie showing of immunity.  Further, counsel did not ask to call any 
witnesses in support of his position, did not object to the trial court's hearing the 
motion without the calling of witnesses, and did not ask to proffer additional 
testimony or indicate to the trial court the additional testimony he would have 
presented had he been entitled to a full testimonial evidentiary hearing.   
17 

  
 
 
 
 
  
                                        
denial of immunity under subsections (A) and (C) of section 16-11-440.  First, the 
victim was an invited guest in Respondent's home, meaning Respondent was not 
entitled to the presumption of immunity under subsection (A).  See Curry, 406 S.C. 
at 370, 752 S.E.2d at 266 ("Section 16–11–440(A), the main thrust of the Act, 
provides a presumption of reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great 
bodily injury to a person who uses deadly force if he is attacked by or attempting 
to remove another from a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle. However, the 
presumption of subsection (A) does not apply if the victim has an equal right to be 
in the dwelling or residence. S.C. Code Ann. § 16–11–440(B). Because Collins 
was a social guest and rightfully in the apartment, subsection (A) is inapplicable to 
Appellant, and he is therefore defaulted into subsection (C), which deals with the 
use of force by one who is attacked in another place where he has a right to be.").  
Further, the victim was unarmed at the time she was shot, meaning we cannot say 
that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Respondent immunity under 
subsection (C). See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440(C) (providing "[a] person who is 
not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in another place where he 
has a right to be . . . has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his ground 
and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he reasonably believes it is 
necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or another person or to 
prevent the commission of a violent crime . . . ." (emphasis added)).  Because these 
essential facts were undisputed and the trial judge heard legal arguments from both 
sides on the applicability of these subsections in Respondent's case, we agree with 
the State that the trial judge heard and considered all that was necessary to make 
the immunity determination by a preponderance of the evidence. As a result, 
Respondent received the pre-trial determination he was entitled to under Duncan, 
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making that ruling without first 
conducting a full testimonial evidentiary hearing.6 
6 Because we find the hearing here was sufficient, we need not address the State's 
alternative argument that the court of appeals erred in remanding the case to the 
trial court instead of reviewing the trial court's determination that Respondent was 
not entitled to immunity under the Act under a harmless error analysis.  See Futch 
v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999). 
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CONCLUSION
  Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision remanding this case to the trial 
court for a full evidentiary hearing is 
REVERSED. 
BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, C.J., 
dissenting in a separate opinion.
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CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I respectfully dissent and would affirm the 
unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals that remanded this matter to the 
circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on respondent's claim for immunity 
pursuant to the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act). 
A defendant claiming immunity under the Act must establish his entitlement to this 
relief by a preponderance of the evidence in a pretrial "determination."  State v. 
Duncan, 392 S.C. 404, 709 S.E.2d 662 (2011); see also State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 
364, 752 S.E.2d 263 (2013). The majority holds today that in making this pretrial 
determination the circuit judge need not always hold a full evidentiary hearing, but 
rather may limit the defendant's right to present evidence entitling him to immunity 
in order "to save precious judicial resources." 7  The majority then proceeds to 
"review" the merits of the trial court's denial of respondent's immunity claim under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  What the majority glosses over, however, is that 
the trial judge held that the Act did not apply and therefore denied respondent's
request for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his immunity claim, 
compounding his earlier refusal to allow respondent to call a forensics and 
ballistics expert to testify in support of respondent's self-defense theory. While the 
trial judge neither heard evidence8 nor made a pre-trial determination that 
respondent was not entitled to immunity under the Act, the majority nonetheless 
states it is upholding the pre-trial determination under an abuse of discretion 
7 The majority's reliance on State v. Wessinger, 408 S.C. 416, 759 S.E.2d 405 
(2014) and the statutory scheme for determining whether a defendant should be 
designated a sexually violent predator (SVP) is misplaced.  In making this 
determination, the trial/plea judge is vested with complete discretion to decide 
whether a crime is sexually violent, without any requirement that the State actually 
request such a finding, much less that it meet any burden of proof.  Since the SVP 
designation rests completely in the trial judge's discretion, it is not surprising that 
the decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is made on a case-by-case 
basis. The Act, on the other hand, requires a motion by a party, and places on the 
defendant the burden of proving entitlement to immunity by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Duncan, supra. In my opinion, the majority errs in relying on the 
SVP procedure to decide the process due a defendant under the Act. 
8 The trial judge's ruling was based solely on the argument of counsel and the 
solicitor's reading of excerpts from respondent's statement to the police.  It is 
axiomatic that arguments of counsel are not evidence.  E.g., Sosebee v. Leeke, 293 
S.C. 531, 362 S.E.2d 22 (1987). 
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standard, finding "the hearing here was sufficient."  The record belies the fact that 
there was any evidentiary hearing afforded to respondent, much less a "sufficient" 
one. 
In my opinion, the Court of Appeals properly remanded this case in order to permit 
respondent an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim of immunity 
under the Act. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 

In the Matter of Jarrett Skipper Calder, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001772 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim
suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
(SCACR). 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
Within fifteen (15) days of this order, respondent shall serve and file the affidavit 
required by Rule 30, RLDE. Should respondent fail to timely file the required 
affidavit, respondent may be held in civil and/or criminal contempt of this Court as 
provided by Rule 30, RLDE.    
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
August 30, 2016 
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Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, 
 
IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic Filing (E-Filing) of 
documents in the Court of Common Pleas, which was established by Order dated 
December 1, 2015, is expanded to include Cherokee County.  Effective September 13, 
2016, all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or pending in Cherokee 
County must be E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney, unless the type of 
case or the type of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program.  The counties currently 
designated for mandatory E-Filing are as follows:   
 
Clarendon  Lee  Greenville 
Sumter  Williamsburg  Pickens 
Spartanburg  Cherokee—Effective September 13, 2016 
 
Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and 
Guidelines, which were adopted by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the 
training materials available at http://www.sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether 
any specific filings are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.  
Attorneys who have cases pending in Pilot Counties are strongly encouraged to 
review, and to instruct their staff to review, the training materials available on the E-
Filing Portal. 
s/Costa M. Pleicones   
Costa M. Pleicones 
Chief Justice of South Carolina 
 
 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Expansion of Electronic Filing Pilot Program - Court of 
Common Pleas 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439 
ORDER
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  Columbia, South Carolina
August 31, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

South Carolina Department of Revenue, Respondent, 
v. 
Meenaxi, Inc., d/b/a Corner Mart, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000292 
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
	
Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Judge 

Opinion No. Op. 5439
	
Heard April 19, 2016 – Filed September 7, 2016
	
AFFIRMED 
S. Jahue Moore and John Calvin Bradley, Jr., both of 
Moore Taylor Law Firm, P.A., of West Columbia, for 
Appellant. 
Milton Gary Kimpson, Lauren Acquaviva, and Sean 
Gordon Ryan, all of Columbia, for Respondent.  
LOCKEMY, C.J.:  Meenaxi, Inc. d/b/a Corner Mart (Appellant) appeals the 
administrative law court's (ALC's) order affirming the South Carolina Department 
of Revenue's (the Department) revocation of an off premises beer and wine permit 
that allowed alcohol to be sold at the Corner Mart.  On appeal, Appellant argues 
(1) the ALC erred in determining the Department brought and pursued this action 
against the proper parties; (2) the Department's failure to bring and pursue this case 
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against the proper parties violated the due process rights of Malkesh Patel—the 
owner of Meenaxi, Inc. and the Corner Mart; (3) the ALC erred in revoking 
Appellant's permit pursuant to subsection 61-4-580(5) of the South Carolina Code 
(2009); (4) the ALC's factual findings and legal conclusions were based upon 
erroneously admitted testimony and evidence; and (5) the ALC abused its 
discretion and committed an error of law by determining that revocation of the 
permit was the appropriate penalty.  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Meenaxi, Inc. owns the Corner Mart, a convenience store located in Anderson that 
sold beer and wine pursuant to an off premises beer and wine permit issued by the 
Department on January 19, 2012. On February 26, 2013, Agent Thomas
Bielawski—a special agent in the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division's 
(SLED's) Video Gambling Unit—conducted a regulatory inspection of the Corner 
Mart pursuant to section 61-4-230 of the South Carolina Code (2009) and 
discovered two video gaming machines—a Products Direct machine and a Gift 
Surplus machine—in the store.  Agent Bielawksi examined the machines and 
determined they were illegal video gaming machines, as defined by section 12-21-
2710 of the South Carolina Code (2014). Accordingly, he seized the machines 
pursuant to his authority under section 12-21-2712 of the South Carolina Code 
(2014).1 In addition, he issued a citation to "Malkesh Patel Meenaxi, Inc." for 
violating section 12-21-2710 and subsection 61-4-580(5)2 because he determined 
1 Section 12-21-2712 provides, 
Any machine, board, or other device prohibited by 
[s]ection 12-21-2710 must be seized by any law 
enforcement officer and at once taken before any 
magistrate of the county in which the machine, board, or 
device is seized who shall immediately examine it, and if 
satisfied that it is in violation of [s]ection 12-21-2710 or 
any other law of this State, direct that it be immediately 
destroyed.
2 Subsection 61-4-580(5) prohibited the holder of a permit authorizing the sale of 
beer or wine from knowingly allowing a crime to be committed on the licensed 
premises. 
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Appellant had knowingly kept illegal video gaming machines inside the Corner 
Mart. 
Agent Bielawski then brought the machines before an Anderson County 
magistrate. The magistrate examined the machines, determined they were illegal 
video gaming machines, and issued an Order of Destruction on March 1, 2013.3 
The Order of Destruction stated, "The Defendant has 15 days from the receipt of 
this Order to request a Post Seizure Hearing to contest the illegality of the 
machine(s). Otherwise, the machine(s) will be destroyed."  The owner of the 
machines, Encore Entertainment, requested a post-seizure hearing, which was 
scheduled for December 17, 2013. Encore Entertainment subsequently withdrew 
its request for a post-seizure hearing, and the magistrate issued a Final Order on 
December 18, 2013, finding the machines illegal and ordering their destruction.4 
On March 28, 2013, the Department gave Appellant written notice of its intent to 
revoke the off premises beer and wine permit. On April 3, 2013, Appellant 
protested the revocation of the permit.  On May 8, 2013, the Department issued a 
written determination that Appellant violated subsection 61-4-580(5) by knowingly 
permitting illegal gaming machines to be kept on its premises. The Department 
determined revocation of the off premises beer and wine permit was the 
appropriate penalty for violating subsection 61-4-580(5). Appellant appealed the 
Department's determination to the ALC.  
On December 4, 2014, the ALC held a contested case hearing on this matter. In an 
order issued on January 8, 2015, the ALC affirmed the Department's revocation of 
the permit. The ALC found the record contained sufficient evidence that the
3 The action before the magistrate was originally captioned "SLED v. Corner 
Mart." The parties subsequently stipulated that the original caption should be 
amended to list only the machines as the defendants in the civil forfeiture action 
and that the store and store owner were not proper parties to the action because the 
forfeiture action was in rem. Appellant noted at trial that it "brought [this] issue 
up" to the magistrate and the magistrate "ruled in his final order that we were 
dismissed because we weren't a proper party to it and should never have been a 
party to it."
4 The magistrate's Final Order was captioned "SLED v. One (1) Products Direct 
Machine and One (1) Gift Surplus Machine."
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Department met its burden of showing the two machines contained games of 
chance in violation of section 12-21-2710, the machines were located on 
Appellant's premises, and Appellant knowingly permitted the machines to be 
placed on its premises in violation of subsection 61-4-580(5). Appellant filed a 
motion for reconsideration, which the ALC denied. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In an appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, the Administrative 
Procedures Act [(the APA)] provides the appropriate standard of review."  
Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 380 S.C. 600, 
604, 670 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ct. App. 2008).  "Pursuant to the APA, this court may 
reverse or modify the ALC if the appellant's substantial rights have been 
prejudiced because the administrative decisions are: (a) in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the 
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) affected by an error of law; (e) 
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the 
whole record; or (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion 
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."  MRI at Belfair, LLC v. S.C. Dep't of 
Health & Envtl. Control, 394 S.C. 567, 572, 716 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Ct. App. 2011). 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
A. Proper Parties 
1. Civil Forfeiture Action in the Magistrate Court
Appellant argues because neither Patel nor Meenaxi, Inc. was a party to the civil 
forfeiture action in the magistrate court, the magistrate's orders may not be used 
against Patel or Meenaxi, Inc. in any way.  Thus, Appellant asserts the ALC erred 
in admitting the magistrate's Order of Destruction and Final Order into evidence.  
We disagree. 
"The government's seizure of alleged contraband may arise in the context of a civil 
or criminal forfeiture proceeding." Mims Amusement Co. v. S.C. Law Enf't Div., 
366 S.C. 141, 150 n.4, 621 S.E.2d 344, 348 n.4 (2005).  "The critical difference 
between civil forfeiture and criminal forfeiture is the identity of the defendant.  In 
civil forfeiture, the Government proceeds against a thing (rem). In criminal 
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forfeiture, it proceeds against a human being (personam)." Id. (quoting U.S. v. 
Croce, 345 F.Supp.2d 492, 494 (E.D. Pa. 2004)).  We find the seized Products 
Direct and Gift Surplus machines were the only proper defendants in the civil 
forfeiture action before the magistrate.  See Union Cty. Sheriff's Office v. 
Henderson, 395 S.C. 516, 518 n.1, 719 S.E.2d 665, 666 n.1 (2011) (stating because 
a civil forfeiture action to determine whether machines are illegal gambling 
machines subject to destruction is an action in rem, "the proper defendants are only 
the . . . seized machines which are the subject of the Order of Destruction").   
In addition, we find the magistrate's orders were admissible evidence in this case 
because they were in rem determinations about the illegal character of the video 
gaming machines seized from the Corner Mart.  See Ex parte Kenmore Shoe Co., 
50 S.C. 140, 146, 27 S.E. 682, 684 (1897) ("Where the court has jurisdiction of the 
res, its decree in rem upon the character or status of the subject-matter is binding, 
not only on the parties and their privies, but also upon all persons who might have 
asserted an interest therein."); id. at 147, 27 S.E. at 684 (stating in rem judgments 
bind third persons and are "conclusive evidence against all the world"); Fitchette v. 
Sumter Hardwood Co., 145 S.C. 53, 67−68, 142 S.E. 828, 833 (1928) ("A judicial 
record is always admissible to prove the fact that a judgment has been rendered, 
the time of its rendition, and the terms and effect of the judgment, for the mere fact 
that a judgment was given, this being a thing done by public authority, can never 
be considered as res inter alios acta, nor can the legal consequences of the rendition 
of such judgment be so considered."). 
2. Permit Revocation Action 
Appellant argues the ALC erred in refusing to dismiss this case on the ground that 
the Department failed to sue the correct parties.  Specifically, Appellant argues the 
permit was issued to Patel and Meenaxi, Inc. but neither was made a party to this 
action. In addition, Appellant asserts there was no evidence at trial that "Meenaxi, 
Inc. d/b/a Corner Mart"—the corporate entity designated as the defendant in this 
action—exists. We disagree.
Patel testified his corporation, Meenaxi, Inc., owned and operated the Corner Mart. 
Appellant's beer and wine permit listed the following information:
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Malkesh Patel 

Meenaxi Inc. 

713 Britton St 

Anderson[,] SC 29621-2614 

Corner Mart 

1010 E Shockley Ferry Road 

Anderson, SC 29624 

Title 61 of the South Carolina Code governs "Alcohol and Alcoholic Beverages,"
and section 61-2-100 of the South Carolina Code (2009) describes the "[p]ersons 
entitled to be licensees or permittees."  As used in Title 61 "and unless otherwise 
required by the context," the term "'[p]erson' includes an individual, a trust, estate, 
partnership, limited liability company, receiver, association, company, corporation, 
or any other group." S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-100(H)(1) (2009).  "Licenses and 
permits may be issued only to the person who is the owner of the business seeking 
the permit or license."  S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-100(A) (2009).
Based on Patel's testimony and the information listed on the permit, we find it was 
reasonable for the ALC to conclude that Meenaxi, Inc. owned and operated the 
Corner Mart—and in effect was doing business as the Corner Mart—even though 
the permit did not include the words "doing business as" or "d/b/a."  
We further find that Appellant was the sole permit holder and Patel—the owner of 
Appellant—was simply Appellant's principal and designated agent.  See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 61-2-100(H)(2)(a),(g) (2009) (stating under Title 61, "a person who owns 
twenty-five percent or more of the value of the business entity" and "an officer of 
the business or entity which owns the business" are considered "principals" of the 
business or entity); S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-100(F) (2009) ("Businesses licensed or 
permitted by the department under this title must designate with the department an 
agent and mailing address for service of notices.").  Because the permit at issue 
here was held by a business rather than an individual, section 61-2-100(F) 
mandated that Appellant designate an agent to receive service of notices.  As the 
Department explained at oral argument, Patel was not the permit holder—he was 
simply Appellant's contact person.  Because Patel was not the permit holder, the 
Department was not required to add him as a party to this permit revocation action. 
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B. Due Process 
Appellant argues the ALC erred in finding the Department did not violate Patel's 
due process rights by failing to add him as a party to this action. Appellant also 
argues the Department's failure to name Patel as a party prejudiced Patel because 
he had no opportunity to inspect the machines destroyed upon the magistrate's 
order. We disagree.
"No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi judicial decision of an 
administrative agency affecting private rights except on due notice and an 
opportunity [to] be heard . . . and he shall have in all such instances the right to 
judicial review." Stono River Envtl. Prot. Ass'n v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, 305 S.C. 90, 94, 406 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1991) (quoting S.C. Const. art. I, § 
22). "[P]roof of a denial of due process in an administrative proceeding requires a 
showing of substantial prejudice."  Palmetto All., Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
282 S.C. 430, 435, 319 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1984). 
As stated previously, Patel was not a proper party to the magistrate court action, 
and the Department was not required to add him as a party to this permit 
revocation action because he was not the permit holder.  Therefore, Patel cannot 
complain of prejudice from the fact that he was not a party to those actions.
C. Inspection of the Corner Mart
Appellant argues the ALC erred in failing to rule that Agent Bielawski's inspection 
of the Corner Mart exceeded his statutory authority under section 61-4-230 of the 
South Carolina Code (2009) and violated the Fourth Amendment.  We disagree.  
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. "Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless an 
exception to the warrant requirement is presented."  State v. Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 
35, 274 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1981).  
"Searches within the scope of a liquor control statute fall under the so-called 
'pervasively regulated industry' doctrine as an exception to the warrant 
requirement." 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 740 (2014); see also New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) ("Because the owner or operator of commercial 
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 premises in a 'closely regulated' industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the 
warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth 
Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search, have lessened 
application in this context." (citation omitted)).  "Because liquor license holders 
have certainty regarding the statutory and regulatory licensing standards and 
regarding their obligation to permit inspection of the licensed premises for 
compliance with those standards, a statutory and regulatory scheme authorizing 
administrative inspections provides an adequate substitute for a warrant to search 
those premises."  48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 740 (2014). "However, a 
liquor inspector's statutory and regulatory authority to conduct an administrative 
inspection is limited to a search of the licensed premises for violations of the liquor 
statutes and regulations."   Id. "Thus, agents may conduct a valid administrative 
search of a liquor licensee's premises when they enter the premises without a 
warrant to investigate the possible violation of a regulation prohibiting gambling 
devices on any premises where liquor is sold because the search covers an 
administrative, rather than a criminal, violation."  Id. 
 
SLED has "specific and exclusive jurisdiction and authority statewide" regarding 
"law enforcement, regulation enforcement, and inspections under Title 61."  S.C. 
Code Ann. § 23-3-15(A)(7) (2007).  Under section 61-4-230, 
 
A person who, upon demand of an officer or agent of the 
division: 
(1)  	 refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or 
any part of the premises which is licensed to sell 
beer or wine; or 
(2)  	 refuses to allow full inspection of the stocks and 
invoices of the licensee; or 
(3)  	 who prevents or in any way hinders an inspection is 
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . 
 
Agent Bielawski conducted a regulatory alcoholic beverage license inspection of 
the Corner Mart on February 26, 2013.  Inside the store, Agent Bielawski 
observed two machines that appeared to be illegal video gambling machines.  The 
machines had been turned off and unplugged.  Agent Bielawski testified the store 
clerk, Ursula Dean, informed him that the store's owner had unplugged the 
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machines and removed the cash from inside them before Agent Bielawski arrived 
at the Corner Mart. Agent Bielawski plugged in the machines and observed that 
they offered numerous illegal games, including poker, blackjack, and keno.  After 
discovering the illegal games on the machines, he and another officer seized the 
two machines, and he issued a citation to "Malkesh Patel Meenaxi, Inc." for 
"permitting games that constitute a crime under state law."  Agent Bielawski then 
used keys provided by Dean to open the machines and determine whether they 
contained money.  
We find Agent Bielawski's alcoholic beverage license inspection did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment because the "pervasively regulated industry" exception to 
the warrant requirement applied. In addition, we note section 61-4-230 authorized 
Agent Bielawski to inspect the Corner Mart because that statute states anyone who 
"refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part of the premises which 
is licensed to sell beer or wine" or "who prevents or in any way hinders an 
inspection is guilty of a misdemeanor."  This right to inspect allowed Agent 
Bielawski to fully search the machines to determine whether they were illegal 
gaming machines that might subject Appellant to liability under subsection 61-4-
580(5). Specifically, this right to inspect allowed Agent Bielawski to plug in the 
machines to determine whether they offered illegal games and to open the 
machines to determine whether they contained money.  Accordingly, we find 
Agent Bielawski's warrantless search of the machines did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.
D. Admission of Evidence 
1. Agent Bielawski's Investigative Report 
Appellant argues the ALC erred in admitting Agent Bielawski's investigative 
report into evidence because the report was generated pursuant to Agent 
Bielawski's unlawful search5 and because it included inadmissible hearsay 
statements from Dean, Agent Bielawski's subjective legal opinion that the 
machines were illegal, and the magistrate's non-binding conclusions. 
5 Because Agent Bielawski's inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment, this 
argument has no merit. 
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The Department introduced the investigative report Agent Bielawski prepared after 
inspecting the Corner Mart.  In the report, Agent Bielawski stated he noticed "two 
video poker machines" in the store while conducting his inspection.  In addition, 
the report stated Dean informed Agent Bielawski that Patel "had been aware that 
SLED was in the area" and that Patel emptied the money from the machines, 
turned off the power switches, and unplugged the machines from the wall before 
Agent Bielawski arrived at the store. The report also stated a magistrate examined 
the machines, determined they were illegal video gaming machines prohibited by 
section 12-21-2710, and ordered their destruction.
Initially, we note, as discussed in Section A of this opinion, the magistrate's
findings were admissible evidence in this case.  Therefore, we find the ALC did 
not err in admitting the portions of the report that related to the magistrate's order. 
We further note Agent Bielawski's report is generally admissible under the 
business records exception to the rule against hearsay.  See Rule 802, SCRE 
("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by [the South Carolina Rules of 
Evidence] or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of this State or by 
statute."); Ex parte Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 350 S.C. 243, 249−50, 565 
S.E.2d 293, 297 (2002) ("Rule 803(6), SCRE, provides that memorand[a], reports, 
records, etc. in any form, of acts, events, conditions, or diagnoses, are admissible 
as long[] as they are (1) prepared near the time of the event recorded; (2) prepared 
by someone with or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) 
prepared in the regular course of business; (4) identified by a qualified witness who 
can testify regarding the mode of preparation of the record; and (5) found to be 
trustworthy by the court."). Agent Bielawski testified he documented his 
inspection of the Corner Mart in a report and he normally kept such reports in the 
ordinary course of business. The report was stamped "Received" by "SCDOR 
ABL SECTION" on March 27, 2013, which indicates Agent Bielawski prepared 
the report sometime within one month after his February 26, 2013 inspection.   
We note that much of the content of Agent Bielawski's report is specifically 
excluded by the business records exception because it is Agent Bielawski's 
subjective opinion and judgment.  See Rule 803(6), SCRE (providing business 
records are admissible but stating "that subjective opinions and judgments found in 
business records are not admissible"); S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. McCarson, 
391 S.C. 136, 147 n.11, 705 S.E.2d 425, 430 n.11 (2011) (finding the business 
records exception "would appear to support the Department's position [that a police 
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report is admissible]. However, a closer reading of the [business records 
exception] reveals that [the officer's] observations in the form of the Incident 
Report are specifically excluded").  Nevertheless, we find the admission of Agent 
Bielawski's opinion was a harmless error because there was abundant evidence that 
the machines were illegal—including Agent Bielawski's testimony about the games 
the machines offered, the magistrate's order finding the machines illegal, and 
Patel's testimony that when people "won a hand," he paid them the amount the 
machine said to pay.
Further, we find the ALC did not err in admitting the portion of the report 
containing Dean's statements because such employee statements are not hearsay.  
"A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and 
is . . . a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the 
scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the 
relationship . . . ." Rule 801(d)(2)(D), SCRE.  The portion of the SLED report 
containing references to Dean's statements did not contain Agent Bielawski's 
subjective opinions or judgments; therefore that portion would be admissible under 
the business records exception since Dean's statements were admissible as 
admissions by a party opponent.    
We find substantial evidence supported the ALC's finding that Dean was an 
employee and agent of Patel and Meenaxi, Inc. and made the challenged 
statements within the scope of her employment. Agent Bielawski testified that 
when he entered the Corner Mart, he identified himself to Dean, who was the store 
clerk on duty behind the counter. Agent Bielawski explained he knew Dean was 
the store clerk "[b]ecause she was behind the counter in a role that a store clerk 
would have in any other store just like it."  In addition, Agent Bielawski testified 
Dean told him that Patel was her boss. Further, Dean's statements concerned a 
matter within the scope of her employment because they related to her boss's 
actions with the machines found in the store where she worked. Therefore, we find 
Dean's hearsay statements were admissible as statements by a party, and the 
reference to those statements in Agent Bielawski's report were admissible under 
the business records exception. 
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2. Agent Bielawski's Testimony 
Appellant asserts the ALC erred in allowing Agent Bielawski to (1) testify about 
statements Dean made to him6; (2) speculate about the business arrangement 
between the individuals and entities identified on the permit; and (3) testify about 
his experience with similar machines, individuals who play such machines, and the 
coupons issued by the machines because he was never qualified as an expert.  
"If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which (a) are 
rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) are helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) do not require special knowledge, skill, experience or training."  Rule 701, 
SCRE. 
Agent Bielawski stated the words "doing business as" did not appear on the 
permit.  However, when asked what "doing business as" meant according to the 
permit, Agent Bielawski responded, "Corner Mart."  Agent Bielawski testified his 
training and experience as an alcoholic beverage inspector taught him to 
understand alcoholic beverage licenses and identify "what the different things on 
the license[s] mean."  He testified he was "trained to realize that [the] bottom
section is for the purpose of identifying the doing business as name[,] and having 
done thousands of alcoholic beverage license inspections, that is consistent in 
every case with the doing business license versus the actual corporate name, 
which is above it." 
We find the ALC erred in allowing Agent Bielawski to give his legal conclusion 
that, based on his interpretation of the permit, Meenaxi, Inc. did business as the 
Corner Mart. However, we believe this error was harmless because the ALC could 
6 During his inspection of the Corner Mart, Agent Bielawski observed the two 
machines had been turned off and unplugged.  Agent Bielawski testified Dean 
informed him that the store owner had unplugged the machines and removed the 
cash from inside the machines before he arrived at the Corner Mart. As previously 
stated, Dean's hearsay statements about Patel's actions with the machines were 
admissible as statements by a party.  
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have concluded on its own, based on the other evidence presented, that Meenaxi, 
Inc. did business as the Corner Mart.  Specifically, a photograph of the permit was 
admitted as an exhibit, so the ALC was able to examine the permit and make its 
own determination as to whether Meenaxi, Inc. did business as the Corner Mart.  In 
addition, the ALC heard Patel's testimony that his corporation, Meenaxi, Inc., 
owned and operated the Corner Store.
Agent Bielawski also testified about his experiences with video gaming machines.  
Agent Bielawski stated he learned Patel unplugged the machines before he arrived 
at the store and, in his experience, unplugging the machines was "a very common 
tactic" people used.  Further, Agent Bielawski testified that—based on his training,
experience, previous inspections, and interviews with people who play such 
machines—he knew discarding the coupons generated by the machines was "very 
common" because the coupons had "no value" to the players.  We find the ALC 
did not err in admitting this testimony.  Agent Bielawski was simply testifying 
about his knowledge as a law enforcement officer based on his previous 
observations. In addition, the ALC was able to draw its own conclusions 
irrespective of Agent Bielawski's testimony. 
E. Section 61-4-580 
1. Subsection 61-4-580(5) 
Appellant argues the ALC erred in finding it violated subsection 61-4-580(5) by 
knowingly permitting an act on its premises that constituted a crime. We disagree.
Subsection 61-4-580(5) provides that "[n]o holder of a permit authorizing the sale 
of beer or wine or a servant, agent, or employee of the permittee may 
knowingly . . . permit any act . . . [that] constitutes a crime under the laws of this 
State" to be committed on the licensed premises. 
Pursuant to section 12-21-2710, 
It is unlawful for any person to keep on his premises or 
operate or permit to be kept on his premises or operated 
within this State any vending or slot machine, or any 
video game machine with a free play feature operated by 
a slot in which is deposited a coin or thing of value, or 
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other device operated by a slot in which is deposited a 
coin or thing of value for the play of poker, blackjack, 
keno, lotto, bingo, or craps, or any machine or device 
licensed pursuant to [s]ection 12-21-2720 and used for 
gambling . . . . 
We hold substantial evidence supported the ALC's finding that the Department 
showed the Products Direct and Gift Surplus machines contained games of chance 
in violation of section 12-21-2710, the machines were located on Appellant's 
licensed premises, and Appellant knowingly permitted the machines to be placed 
on its premises. 
To show the machines were illegal video gambling machines, the Department 
presented the magistrate's Order of Destruction and Agent Bielawski's testimony 
and investigative report. Agent Bielawski's report stated that, while conducting a 
regulatory inspection of the Corner Mart, he noticed two video gaming machines 
inside the store—one bearing the name "Products Direct Sweepstakes" and the 
other bearing the name "Gift Surplus."  Agent Bielawski testified the Gift Surplus 
machine had poker, spinning reel games, and keno; and the Products Direct 
machine had poker, blackjack, and keno.  Agent Bielawski also testified the 
magistrate examined the machines in his presence, determined the machines were 
illegal, and ordered their destruction.7 
To be liable under subsection 61-4-580(5), Appellant had to have actual or 
constructive knowledge that the machines it allowed to be placed in its store were 
7 Appellant argues the destruction of the machines was tantamount to spoliation 
and violated Appellant's due process rights. We disagree because Appellant failed 
to show that the State destroyed the machines in bad faith or that the machines 
possessed an exculpatory value apparent before they were destroyed.  See State v. 
Breeze, 379 S.C. 538, 545, 665 S.E.2d 247, 251 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The State does 
not have an absolute duty to safeguard potentially useful evidence that might 
vindicate a defendant."); id. ("To establish a due process violation, a defendant 
must demonstrate (1) that the State destroyed the evidence in bad faith, or (2) that 
the evidence possessed an exculpatory value apparent before the evidence was 
destroyed and the defendant cannot obtain other evidence of comparable value by 
other means." (quoting State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 538−39, 552 S.E.2d 
300, 307 (2001))).
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 illegal video gambling machines.  The ALC found that Patel knew or should have 
known the machines were illegal and that Patel's testimony to the contrary was not 
credible.  There was substantial evidence for the ALC to make a finding that Patel 
knew or should have known the machines were illegal.  Specifically, Patel testified 
if someone "won a hand," he paid the person "whatever the machine said [to] pay."   
Further, according to the investigative report, Patel explained to Agent Bielawski 
that the machines' owner, Encore Entertainment, took money from the machines 
every Monday or Tuesday and split the revenue equally with him.  In addition, 
when the Department asked Patel whether he knew the machines were illegal on 
the day SLED inspected his store, Patel responded, "Yes, the owner called me and 
told me to unplug the machines."  Further, Agent Bielawski's report stated Dean 
informed him that Patel "had been aware that SLED was in the area" and that Patel 
emptied the money from the machines, turned off the power switches, and 
unplugged the machines from the wall before SLED arrived at the store.  Based on 
the foregoing, we find substantial evidence supported the ALC's finding that 
Appellant violated subsection 61-4-580(5).  
 
2. Subsection 61-4-580(3) 
 
Appellant argues the ALC erred in finding the machines did not fall under the "safe 
harbor" provision found in subsection 61-4-580(3) of the South Carolina Code 
(2009). We disagree. 
 
The version of subsection 61-4-580(3) in effect at the time of the inspection 
provided as follows: 
No holder of a permit authorizing the sale of beer or wine 
or a servant, agent, or employee of the permittee may 
knowingly commit any of the following acts upon the 
licensed premises covered by the holder's permit: . . .  
(3)  permit gambling or games of chance except game 
promotions including contests, games of chance, or 
sweepstakes in which the elements of chance and 
prize are present and which comply with the 
following: 
(a) 	 the game promotion is conducted or offered in 
connection with the sale, promotion, or 
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advertisement of a consumer product or service, 
or to enhance the brand or image of a supplier 
of consumer products or services; 
(b) no purchase payment, entry fee, or proof of 
purchase is required as a condition of entering 
the game promotion or receiving a prize; and 
(c) 	 all materials advertising the game promotion 
clearly disclose that no purchase or payment is 
necessary to enter and provide details on the 
free method of participation. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-580(3) (2009). 
 
The ALC determined the exception outlined in subsection 61-4-580(3) did not 
apply to the machines at issue here because the machines failed to satisfy 
subsection (b)'s requirement that "no purchase payment, entry fee, or proof of 
purchase is required as a condition of entering the game promotion or receiving a 
prize." The ALC found the machines clearly required payment to play the games 
because Agent Bielawski could not play any games without inserting money into 
the machine. The ALC noted Appellant argued the machines required payment for 
the receipt of coupons—which could be redeemed online for merchandise—and 
that after the coupons were purchased, the games on the machines were free to 
play. However, the ALC determined the coupons had no value and "[t]he coupon 
scheme was a thinly veiled artifice designed to conceal the fact that payment was 
made solely to play the games." 
 
We find substantial evidence supported the ALC's finding that the exception set 
forth in subsection 61-4-580(3) did not apply to these machines because a patron 
could not play a game on the machines without first inserting money into the 
machines. Agent Bielawski testified although the faces of the machines displayed 
the words "no purchase necessary," the game promotions were offered in 
conjunction with the sale of coupons.  Agent Bielawski was able to view a display 
image of the poker game on the screen without paying, but the machine would not 
allow him to play the game unless he inserted money. 
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We also find substantial evidence supported the ALC's finding that the coupons 
had no value. The investigative report stated Agent Bielawski found numerous 
Products Direct and Gift Surplus sweepstakes coupons discarded in the trash and 
lying crumpled on the floor near the machines. Agent Bielawski testified that if 
someone throws a coupon away, he or she cannot use the coupon to make a 
purchase. He also testified the fact the coupons were on the floor showed they 
were not being used for their intended purpose.  We find the fact the coupons were 
discarded shows that the people who used the machines did not consider the 
coupons valuable enough to keep. 
In addition, Agent Bielawski testified he personally examined a Products Direct 
sweepstakes coupon, visited the Products Direct website to determine the coupon's 
value, and concluded the coupon had no value.  He explained that, although the 
coupons could "potentially" be used to purchase a product, the items on the website 
were overpriced "and you could easily go to a local store yourself and pick up the 
same sort of item at a much lower cost than what was this supposed discount that
you receive[d] from playing the [P]roducts [D]irect."  This evidence further shows 
the coupons lacked value. 
F. PENALTY 
Appellant argues the ALC abused its discretion by determining revocation of 
Appellant's permit was the appropriate penalty for Appellant's violation of 
subsection 61-4-580(5). We disagree. 
Section 61-4-580 provides, "[A] violation of any provision of [section 61-4-580] is 
a ground for the revocation or suspension of the holder's permit."  "[The 
Department] has the authority to determine an appropriate administrative penalty, 
within the statutory limits established by the legislature, after the parties have had 
an opportunity for a hearing on the issues."  S.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Sandalwood 
Soc. Club, 399 S.C. 267, 278−79, 731 S.E.2d 330, 336 (Ct. App. 2012).  "[I]n
assessing a penalty, [the Department] 'should give effect to the major purpose of a 
civil penalty,' which is 'deterrence.'"  Id. at 279, 731 S.E.2d at 336 (quoting 
Midlands Util., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 313 S.C. 210, 212, 
437 S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ct. App. 1993)).  "As an administrative agency, [the ALC] is
the fact-finder and it is [the ALC's] prerogative . . . to impose an appropriate 
penalty based on the facts presented." Id. at 279−80, 731 S.E.2d at 337 (alterations 
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in original) (quoting Walker v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 305 S.C. 
209, 210, 407 S.E.2d 633, 634 (1991)).
South Carolina Revenue Procedure No. 13-2 "provides guidelines to be used by 
Department employees in assessing penalties for violations of the statutes and 
regulations governing the sale, distribution, or possession of beer, wine, and 
distilled spirits."8  The Procedure is an advisory opinion that sets guidelines but
"does not establish a binding norm."  Revenue Procedure 13-2 provides revocation 
of a beer and wine permit is the appropriate penalty for "[p]ermitting any act that 
constitutes a crime under the laws of South Carolina (61-4-580(5))" or 
"[p]ermitting games of chance[,] except certain game promotions (61-4-580(3))."  
However, Revenue Procedure 13-2 states the Department may reduce any penalty 
outlined in the Procedure when mitigating circumstances exist—specifically, 
"suspensions may be reduced in duration, and revocations may be reduced to 
suspensions with monetary penalties."  "Mitigating circumstances include, but are 
not limited to" the following: (1) "[t]he employee committing the violation has 
completed a training program recognized by the Department"; (2) "[d]ocumented 
in-house training [is] given to the offending employee on a regular and frequent 
basis"; (3) "[d]ocumentation that an internal check (e.g., visit to the offending store 
by a mystery shopper) designed to ensure compliance occurred within a reasonable 
period of time prior to the offense"; (4) "[a]utomated age verification programs if 
the violation deals with age"; and (5) "[t]he volume of sales of beer, wine or liquor 
at a location," given that "a location with a large number of clerks and a high 
volume of beer sales is more likely to have a problem with violations than a 
location with a small volume of beer sales."  The Procedure provides, "In every 
case, the determination as to whether mitigating circumstances warrant a reduction 
in penalties is within the sole discretion of the Department." 
The Department revoked Appellant's off premises beer and wine permit because 
Appellant violated subsection 61-4-580(5). The ALC found that, according to the 
Department's penalty guidelines, revocation of Appellant's permit was appropriate 
under the circumstances.  The ALC stated that, based on its finding that Appellant 
knew or should have known the machines were illegal and the lack of mitigating 
evidence, it found no reason to deviate from the penalty listed in the guidelines and 
imposed by the Department. 
8 See S.C. Revenue Procedure No. 13-2, Department of Revenue (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://dor.sc.gov/resources-site/lawandpolicy/Advisory%20Opinions/RP13-2.pdf. 
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Recognizing that it is the ALC's prerogative to impose the appropriate penalty 
based on the facts presented, we find the ALC did not abuse its discretion by 
revoking Appellant's beer and wine permit.  Section 61-4-580 authorizes the ALC 
to revoke or suspend a beer and wine permit when the permittee violates section 
61-4-580. In addition, Revenue Procedure 13-2 provides revocation of a beer and 
wine permit is the appropriate penalty for "[p]ermitting any act that constitutes a 
crime under the laws of South Carolina (61-4-580(5))" or "[p]ermitting games of 
chance[,] except certain game promotions (61-4-580(3))."  Thus, the penalty the 
ALC imposed was within the range of penalties authorized by section 61-4-580 
and was the penalty prescribed by the Department in Revenue Procedure 13-2.
We also find the ALC did not abuse its discretion by declining to deviate from the 
Department's penalty guidelines and reduce Appellant's penalty to a fine or 
suspension. We find the mitigating circumstances listed in Revenue Procedure 13-
2 were not present here. We recognize, however, that Revenue Procedure 13-2's 
list of mitigating circumstances is not exhaustive and the Department may consider 
other circumstances not enumerated in Revenue Procedure 13-2 when deciding 
whether to reduce a penalty.  For example, the Department stated at oral argument 
that, when deciding whether to reduce a penalty from revocation to a fine or 
suspension, it considers whether the permittee was misled or genuinely believed 
the video gaming machines were legal.  There was substantial evidence for the 
ALC to make a finding that Appellant knew or should have known the Products 
Direct and Gift Surplus machines in the Corner Mart were illegal.  Further, there 
were no other non-enumerated mitigating circumstances that warranted a reduction 
in Appellant's penalty. We find that, under our standard of review, the revocation 
of Appellant's beer and wine permit, although a rather severe penalty, was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the ALC's decision is 
AFFIRMED. 
WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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